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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OP THE

STATE OF UTAH
KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,
vs.
T H E INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH and ROBERT E. MARKUS,
Defendants.

Case No.
10534

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an original proceedings before the Supreme
Court of Utah for the purpose of having the lawfulness of
an award dated December 14, 1965 of the Industrial Commission of Utah in a proceedings entitled Robert E. Markus,
Applicant, vs. Kennecott Copper Corporation, defendant,
Claim No. 6315, inquired into and determined as provided
by Section 35-1-83, U. C. A., 1953, as amended by Laws of
Utah, 1965.
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DISPOSITION BY INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION OF UTAH
On December 14, 1965, the Industrial Commission of
Utah made its order and award that Kennecott Copper
Corporation pay Robert E. Markus temporary total compensation from June 11, 1964 until Applicant was released
by his physician, that it pay all medical and hospital bills
incurred because of the injury to said Applicant, that it
pay him permanent partial disability for 10% loss of bodily
function of 20 weeks at $51.40 per week for a total of
$1,028.00, and that it pay Matt Biljanic the sum of $150.00
for his services in connection with the proceedings before
the Commission, the same to be deducted from the award.
Kennecott Copper Corporation filed with the Industrial
Commission of Utah a Motion for Review on December 29,
1965 as required by Section 35-1-82.55, U. C. A., 1953, as
enacted by Laws of Utah, 1965 as a prerequisite for the
filing of this action in the Supreme Court of Utah. This
Motion for Review was denied by order of the Industrial
Commission of Utah dated January 13, 1966.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW
Kennecott Copper Corporation, upon this review, seeks
to have the award of the Industrial Commission dated December 14, 1965 set aside by the Supreme Court of Utah.

.-. •'

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Claim and Denial

The claim of Applicant was that he sustained injury
on May 16, 1964 while employed as a brakeman at the
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Bingham open pit copper mine by Kennecott Copper Corporation. That he was re-railing a train car and was pushing a frog up under the wheels and got a sharp pain between his shoulder blades (R. 4). Kennecott denied liability (R. 7). Kennecott, as shown by its Safety Engineer's
report dated July 10, 1964, claimed that there was no accident or incident such as a trip, slip, fall or blow on May 16,
1964 and that Applicant had had back trouble before and
that the pain which Applicant felt on that date and subsequent thereto was the result of his previous bodily condition and was not caused by any accident or incident on May
16, 1964 (R. 12-14).
Proceedings Before the Industrial

Commission

The Employee's Application for Hearing to Settle Industrial Accident Claim was filed with the Industrial Commission of Utah on August 26, 1964 (R. 4). On December
7, 1964, a hearing was held before Commissioner Wiesley
(R. 29-82). The notice of the hearing had written thereon
"Medical evidence will be received only after the panel report has been filed" (R. 11). On February 17, 1965, the
Commission made its order denying the application (R.
83). A Petition for Rehearing was filed with the Commission by Markus on March 8, 1965 (R. 84-6). By order
dated March 12, 1965, the Commission made its order denying the Petition for Rehearing (R. 87). No application
was made by Markus to the Supreme Court of Utah as
provided by Section 35-1-83, U. C. A., 1953, for a Writ of
Certiorari for the purpose of having the lawfulness of the
order denying the application, dated February 17, 1965, or
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the lawfulness of the order denying the Petition for Rehearing, dated March 12, 1965, inquired into and determined. On April 13, 1965, apparently on its own motion, the Commission made an order granting the Petition
for Rehearing and rescinding its order of March 12, 1965
(R. 88).
The Industrial Commission of Utah on June 28, 1965,
made its order setting time and place for further hearing
for the 12th day of July, 1965 and said hearing was held
on said date. Following this hearing, the medical issues
were referred to a Medical Panel by the Industrial Commission and the Medical Panel filed its report with the
Commission (R. 94-5). Copies thereof were mailed by the
Commission to the Applicant and employer on October 19,
1965 (R. 92). No objection was filed to the Medical Panel
report although Kennecott, through its attorneys, filed
With the Commission a letter in regards thereto on November 4, 1965 (R. 96). The Commission, on December 14,
1965, made its order awarding compensation to the Applicant (R. 115). On December 29, 1965, Kennecott filed its
Motion for Review with the Commission (R. 116-17). This
was by the Commission denied on January 13, 1966 (R.
119).
The Claimed Accident
On May 16, 1964, at about 10:00 A.M., Markus was
underneath the wheels of a train car which had been derailed for the purpose of re-railing it. This was part of
his regular duties as a brakeman, at which job he was then
working. At the hearing on December 6, 1964, he testified
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that he was pushing a frog up under the wheels (R. 32-3)
and straining and lifting as much as possible to get it into
position (R. 41). He said that at the time he got a sharp
pain between his shoulder blades (R. 32). A frog is a piece
of equipment used to re-rail a railroad car. According to
Markus, it weighs between 50 and 100 pounds (R. 33). Mr.
Ross Pino, Safety Engineer for Kennecott, testified that
it weighs between 60 and 75 pounds (R. 76). Pictures of
a frog were received in evidence (R. 25-6). Markus continued to work the rest of the shift. He testified that that
afternoon it really started to bother him, that he laid on
a heating pad all that night and the next day he went to
work and went to the Company's clinic in the afternoon
(R. 33). Markus complained to his engineer on the day of
the re-railing that he had hurt his back re-railing the train
(R. 35). The engineer on the train, Mr. Asay, confirmed
that Markus was bothered with his back that afternoon and
more marked the next day. That a day or two before that,
he had worked with Markus and hadn't noticed any problem. Markus worked with Asay only occasionally and they
were never listed permanently as a crew (R. 51). George
J. Strand, the operator of the shovel which was loading the
cars of the train on which Markus was the brakeman, testified that he thought that Markus had indicated that he
suffered some injury because after re-railing the train
and when the cars of the train had been loaded and the
train had gone to the dump and returned to the shovel,
Markus "couldn't hardly get up the ladder" of the engine
(R. 56). He further testified that Markus said he hurt
his back underneath the car and that Markus was going
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around like an old man that was hurt (R. 57). Markus
did not report any accident to his foreman, John Robertson, on the day of the claimed accident (R. 59).
Conduct of Markus After Alleged Accident
Markus continued to work for Kennecott on his regular job from the date of the alleged accident, May 16, 1964,
uninterruptedly on his scheduled days until May 29, 1964
(R. 46-7, 66). Since going to California on or about June
1, 1964, he has continued to reside there. He went to the
office of Lester 0. Hamlin, Industrial Relations Representative of Kennecott on May 28 or 29, 1964 for the purpose
of terminating his employment. Markus did not complain
of any injury that he was suffering from at that time (R.
66). He planned on taking his vacation and terminating
his employment on or about June 8, 1964. On June 7, 1964,
Warren Cole, an official of the Union in which Markus was
a member, notified Hamlin not to remove Markus from the
payroll because he had been hospitalized in California.
Markus was then kept on the payroll (R. 22, 66). He was
still living in California at the time of the original hearing
before Commissioner Wiesley on December 7, 1964 (R.
35-6). He was still there on July 12, 1965 at the time of
the further hearing before Commissioner Wiesley on July
12, 1965 (R. 111). He returned to Salt Lake City to receive medical treatment upon recommendation by California doctors and first consulted Dr. Wayne Hebertson
(R. 36-7) and received various treatments recommended
by him and finally was operated on by Dr. Boyd G. Holbrook on June 25, 1964 who performed an anterior excision
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of the C-6, 7 intervertebral disc and an interbody fusion
(R. 2). He was not referred to either Dr. Hebertson or Dr.
Holbrook by his employer or its doctors, but he received
the services of these doctors at his own request. He did
not consult Kennecott or its doctors after leaving Utah on
or about June 1, 1964 (R. 48).
Markus made application with Travelers Insurance
Company for benefits as a result of the condition of his
neck as a non-industrial accident (R. 72). He explained
that Mr. Christensen who has charge of medical records
for Kennecott (R. 78) told him to go ahead and file with
Travelers and he would have money coming in before waiting for the Industrial Commission decision (R. 81).
Mr. Markus did not file his Application for Hearing
to Settle Industrial Claim with the Industrial Commission
of Utah until August 26 ,1964 which was approximately
two months after he had had the operation by Dr. Holbrook.
The Industrial Commission of Utah had not been requested
to grant permission, for the operation or to authorize it.
Back and Neck Trouble Suffered by Markus
Mr. Markus advised Dr. Holbrook on June 21, 1964
that he has a curvature of the low back due to a birth defect but that he had not had much trouble with it (R. 1).
X-Rays of the cervical spine as reported by Dr. Holbrook
showed a congenital fusion of C-1 and C-3 (R. 2). While
in California in June, 1964, his back bothered him and he
consulted doctors there and returned to Salt Lake City and
was operated on on June 25, 1964 (R. 2). Before the oper-
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ation, a myelogram was performed by Dr. Hebertson which
showed a large defect on the right between C-6 and 7 (R.
103). The operation by Dr. Holbrook confirmed a ruptured
or protruded disc which was excised (R. 2). He had had
back trouble for several years. As early as May 31, 1957,
he had "aching shoulders for five days" (R. 9, 27, 38). He
had an injury to the back on April 13, 1963 (R. 27). The
incident of May 16, 1964 was reported as an industrial injury by Markus when he went to the Company clinic on
May 17, 1964. The dector there diagnosed it as a sprain
(R. 15, 28). Markus also went to Dr. B. 0. Egbert, a chiropractor, during the moths of March, April and May of 1961
(R. 9, 38). He also went to Dr. R. S. Clegg, an orthopedic
surgeon in Salt Lake City in December, 1961 because his
lower back was bothering him (R. 9, 39). Markus slipped
and fell on the ice as he was walking out of his garage in
January, 1963 and had a stiff neck for three or four days
and was off work for four days being treated by Dr. J. A.
Parker (R. 9, 39).
Medical Evidence of th& Claimed Injury to Markus
Kennecott's doctor diagnosed it as a sprain (R. 15, 28).
Dr. Boyd G. Holbrook, who was engaged by Markus as a
private surgeon, performed an operation with the anterior
excision C-6, 7 intervertebral disc and an interbody fusion
on June 25, 1964. This was before Markus filed his claim
with the Industrial Commission. Dr. Holbrook's report of
this operation dated June 30, 1964, however, was made to
Kennecott and a copy sent to the Industrial Commission
and received by it on July 1, 1964 (R. 1). A copy thereof
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was also introduced in evidence as part of Exhibit 1 (R.
19-20) at the hearing before the Commission on December
7, 1964 (R. 61). Dr. Holbrook testified at the further hearing before the Commission on July 12, 1964 (R. 100-12).
His testimony included a repeat of the information given
in his letter of June 30, 1964. In answer to a hypothetical
question as to whether he had an opinion as to the likelihood of Markus suffering an injury, he answered that he
could give an opinion (R. 106). He then gave a dissertation
and explained that it is very rare for a completely normal
disc to ever be ruptured by any type of trauma; that ordinarily when a disc ruptures or protrudes, it is a disc that
has previous degenerative changes and degenerative changes
are almost universal (R. 106). He did in response to a
very leading question answer that it would be likely for a
man to sustain the type of injury where he was doing some
heavy lifting * * * and where he was unable to function properly thereafter (R. 107). (Emphasis added.)
Markus did not tell Dr. Holbrook of his fall on the ice on
January 12, 1963 or that he had received treatments from
Dr. B. O. Egbert or that he had consulted with Dr. Clegg
on January 4,1962.
Markus was examined on August 27, 1965 by a Medical
Panel appointed by the Commission consisting of Norman
R. Beck, M.D., Chairman, Sherman S. Coleman, M.D. and
Samuel Taylor, M.D. They made their report under date of
September 10, 1965 (R. 94-5). The Panel made findings
including the following:
"(1) The type of maneuver as described by
the patient could be conceived to cause the hernia-
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tion of the cervical intervertebral disc giving rise
to nerve root pain" (R. 95).
There is nothing in the report which indicates that
Markus told the Panel about his former back and neck
troubles, including his fall on the ice on January 12, 1963.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
HAD NO JURISDICTION TO ISSUE ITS ORDER OF APRIL 13, 1965 GRANTING THE PETITION FOR REHEARING.
This problem was considered by the Supreme Court
of Utah in the case of Salt Lake City V. Industrial Commission, decided May 25, 1923, 61 Utah 514, 215 P. 1047.
In this case, the applicant, an employee of Salt Lake
City, claimed to have been injured in the course of his employment and filed an application for compensation. A
hearing was had before the Industrial Commission and on
June 17, 1922, compensation was awarded. Salt Lake City
immediately applied for a rehearing, which, on August 1st,
was granted, and on the same day the hearing was had, the
award set aside and compensation denied. On September
6th, the applicant filed a new application before the Commission setting forth the circumstances of the injury the
same as if the case had not been previously determined.
After hearing the evidence, the Commission on December
2nd entered an order setting aside its decision of August
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1st and reinstated its former order awarding compensation.
Salt Lake City applied for a rehearing and when it was
denied by seasonable application to the Supreme Court
sought to have the case reviewed and the award set aside.
The Supreme Court annulled, vacated and set aside the
award of the Commission entered on December 2nd.
The court held that in the last hearing the Commission
proceeded without jurisdiction.
The court interpreted Section 3148, Compiled Laws of
Utah, 1917, as amended in Session Laws, 1919, page 164
which reads as follows:
"Within thirty days after the application for
a rehearing is denied, or, if the application is
granted, within thirty days after the rendition of
the decision on the rehearing, any party affected
thereby (including the state insurance fund), may
apply to the Supreme Court of this state for a writ
of certiorari or review (hereinafter referred to as
a writ of review) for the purpose of having the
lawfulness of the original award or the award on
rehearing inquired into and determined" (215 P.
1047-8, 61 Utah 517).
The provisions of the above quoted section are the
same as Section 35-1-83, U. S. C, 1953, except for the substitution in the latter of the "Commission of Finance" for
"the state insurance fund". This section was later amended
by the 1965 Legislature, the amendment taking effect on
July 1, 1965. This 1965 amendment did not, however, alter
the substance of the section.
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The court also interpreted and had in mind Section
3144 of the Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, which reads as
follows:
"The powers and jurisdiction of the Commission over each case shall be continuing, and it may
from time to time make such modfication or change
with respect to former findings or orders with respect thereto as in its opinion may be justified"
(215 P. 1048, 61 Utah 518).
The provisions of the above quoted section are the same
as Section 35-1-78, U. C. A., 1953, as amended in 1961 and
1963, except for the addition in 1961 of a provision for the
destruction by the Commission of records in certain cases
and in 1963 by the insertion of a reference to a claim filed
as in 35-1-99.
The following language by Judge Thurman appears
applicable to the present case:
"In this case the Commission on the first hearing, in June, 1922, awarded the applicant compensation. The city, in accordance with the provisions
of the section above quoted, applied for a rehearing.
The rehearing was granted, the award set aside,
and compensation denied. Under the plain, unequivocal provisions of the statute the remedy of the
applicant was to apply to this court within 30 days
for a writ of review. Instead of pursuing that
course, applicant delayed for more than 30 days
and filed a new application for a hearing before the
Commission the same as if the case had never before been heard. Such a procedure flies in the very
face of the statute. If such procedure is upheld, litigation before the Commission in any given case may
never end. It was just as obligatory upon the ap-
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plicant, when the Commission granted the city's application for a rehearing, August 1, 1922, to apply
to this court within 30 days for a writ of review, as
it would have been for the city to do so if its application for rehearing had been denied" (215 P. 1048,
61 Utah 517).
The above case was cited with approval in Ferguson
V. Industrial Commission, decided July 21, 1923, 63 Utah
112, 221 P. 1099.
In the Ferguson case, after the denial of compensation,
a Petition for Rehearing was filed with the Industrial Commission on April 28, 1922 which was denied on May 8,
1922. On September 10, 1922, a second Petition for Rehearing was filed which the Commission granted. On the second hearing, the Commission made an order on October 31,
1922 that the application be dismissed. Within 30 days
from the date of the last order, the plaintiff applied to the
Supreme Court for a writ of Review. In referring to the
jurisdiction of the Commission, this court said:
"The first petition for rehearing having been
denied on May 8, 1922, the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission ceased. It was then incumbent
upon the applicant to apply to this court within 30
days for a writ of review or to abide by the decision" (221 P. 1099, 63 Utah 114).
A more recent case of Callahan v. Industrial Commission, decided June 24, 1943, 104 Utah 256, 139 P. 2d 214,
again considered the problem. After a hearing before the
Industrial Commission, the Commission on June 11, 1942
denied compensation. On July 13, 1942, the plaintiff filed
an application with the Commission for a rehearing out-
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lining several reasons therefor and on July 16, 1942, this
application for rehearing was denied. On August 13, 1942,
the plaintiff filed with the Commission a "Supplemental
Application for Rehearing". The Commission took no action on this "Supplemental Application" and the plaintiff
on August 15, 1942 applied to the Supreme Court for a writ
of review. The court made the following statement:
"Plaintiff then filed with what he terms a
'Supplemental Application', three affidavits containing the proffered additional evidence. This was
simply a second petition for rehearing, for which
there is no authority in law. The statute above
quoted is jurisdictional, and the Commission was
warranted in disregarding this untimely 'Supplemental Application'. Ferguson v. Industrial Commission, 63 Utah 112, 221 P. 1099, wherein it is
said:
" 'The first petition for rehearing having
been denied on May 8, 1922, the jurisdiction of
the Industrial Commission ceased. It was then
incumbent upon the applicant to apply to this
court within 30 days for a writ of review or
to abide by the decision. Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commission [61 Utah 514], 215 P.
1047' " (139 P. 2d 216, 104 Utah 260).
The section of the statute referred to was 42-1-76, U.
C. A., 1943 which is the same as 35-1-82, U. C. A., 1953.
None of the above cases have been overruled.
The Commission, in its order of April 13, 1965 granting a rehearing to the Applicant, stated that it was compelled to do so by the Supreme Court's decision on the Ruth
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B. Griffith case, No. 10126 (R. 88). This case is Griffith
V. Industrial Commission, decided February 18, 1965, 16
Utah 2d 264, 399 P. 2d 204. Commissioner Wiesley at the
further hearing held on July 12, 1965 explained:
"The Commission issued an order (ed) on 2-1765 denying Applicant's claim. A petition for rehearing was filed on March 8, 1965. The Supreme
Court decision in the Ruth B. Griffith, No. 1016,
compelled the Commission to rescind its previous
order of 3-12-65, and on 4-13-65 the petition for rehearing was granted.
"The reason for the change is the Supreme
Court finally decided that, if the 30th day falls on
a holiday, they can have until the next working day
to file, and for that reason the petition for rehearing was granted" (R. 99).
The Commission, in its order of December 14, 1965
granting compensation to Markus, also included therein the
above quoted paragraphs.
The reason given was not applicable in this case. The
order denying compensation was dated February 17, 1965
(R. 83). The Petition for Rehearing was filed March 8,
1965 (R. 84). It was filed well within the thirty-day period
provided by 35-1-82, U. C. A., 1953 within which a Petition
for Rehearing is permitted to be filed with the Commission...; -• . .;. r • I-'- -,
•:'- ; V ' ,.-'
It is respectfully submitted that the Industrial Commission had no jurisdiction to issue its order of April 13,
1965 granting the Petition for Rehearing and that it was
not compelled to do so by the decision of the Supreme Court
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in the Ruth B. Griffith case. The only remedy which the
Applicant, Robert H. Markus, had following the decision
of the Industrial Commission denying his application for
rehearing which was dated March 12, 1965 was to apply
to the Supreme Court for a Writ as provided by 35-1-83,
U. C. A., 1953. Inasmuch as he did not do so within thirty
days from the order denying his application for rehearing,
he exhausted his remedy. The order denying compensation
dated March 12, 1965 should be approved and affirmed.
If this court does not agree with plaintiff's contention
on Point 1, then it is necessary for it to give consideration
to plaintiff's Point 2.
POINT II.
THERE ARE NO FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW OR EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT THE AWARD OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION.
Plaintiff is not unmindful of the many cases decided
by this court which hold that the Industrial Commission
is vested with exclusive power and responsibility of deciding questions of fact. It is the contention of plaintiff that
there is no material, substantial, competent, legal evidence
in the record upon which the Commission could make an
award in favor of the Applicant and that in doing so, it
acted arbitrarily.
The Commission, after the original hearing, made its
order dated February 17, 1965 denying compensation. In
the order, it recited the facts of the incident upon which
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the Applicant based his claim for compensation. It found
that there was nothing unusual about the incident. As
plaintiff interprets the order, it negates any unusual exertion, a slip, a fall or a blow suffered by Applicant in the
course of his day in and day out employment activities (R.
83).
The Applicant's surgeon added nothing to the factual
situation. He could not and did not testify that the protruding disc which he excised on June 25, 1964 was caused
by the incident of May 16, 1964. In his report of June 30,
1964, he advised that Markus had related to him that he
was in good health until about one month before when he
was under the wheels of a derailed train and was lifting
and developed a sudden pain between the shoulder blades
(R. 1) (Emphasis added). The order of the Commission
dated February 17, 1965 in effect found that Markus was
not lifting. The application of Markus stated that he was
pushing a frog, not lifting it (R. 4, 83). The commission
in its order of February 17, 1965, stated: "Applicant on
several occasions told about pushing, not lifting a frog.
His counsel suggested lifting" (R. 83).
In the hypothetical question asked of Dr. Holbrook by
Applicant's attorney at the further hearing on July 12,
1965, Dr. Holbrook was asked to assume that Markus on
May 16, 1964 was doing some heavy lifting and was unable
to function properly thereafter (R. 107) (Emphasis
added). These facts were not in evidence and the opinion
of Dr. Holbrook was therefore improper. His opinion was
also given without being informed by Markus that he had
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had previous back and neck trouble. As stated in an opinion of Judge Elias Hansen in the case of Diaz V. Industrial
Commission, decided July 21, 1932, 80 Utah 77, 13 P. 2d
307:
"Answers to hypothetical questions not founded
upon, but contrary to, the established facts in a
case have no probative value" (13 P. 2d 317, 80
Utah 104).
The Industrial Commission, by its order of December
14, 1965 awarding compensation, adopted the Medical Panel
report dated September 10, 1965. The only finding therein
connecting the incident of May 16, 1964 with the herniated
disc for the excision of which Dr. Holbrook operated on
June 25, 1964, is:
"(1) The type of maneuver as described by
the patient could be conceived to cause the herniation of the cervical intervertebral disc giving rise
to nerve root pain" (R. 95) (Emphasis added).
Webster's New International Dictionary, Second Edition, Unabridged, page 552, gives the following definitions
of conceive:
"2. To take into one's mind; as, to conceive
a dislike; to formulate, to devise, form a conception
of, or imagine.
"3. To apprehend by reason or imagination;
to comprehend; to understand.
"4. To think or suppose; to be of the opinion;
as, whatever."
Synonyms given are:
pect."

"Think, suppose, fancy, sus-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
It appears conceive is something similar to possible,
but much less than probable.
It appears that in the minds of the Medical Panel,
there was very grave doubt that the incident of May 16,
1964 caused the herniation of the disc. The Commission,
basing its award to Markus, appears to have done so upon
surmise, conjecture of the likelihood, or at the most, the
possibility that the incident of May 16, 1964 caused the
herniation of the disc.
Although the case of Sugar v. Industrial Commission,
decided January 24, 1938, 94 Utah 56, 75 P. 2d 311 involved
a question of whether or not a gun shot causing death was
self inflicted and therefore not in the course of employment, while in this case the question is whether or not a
particular condition resulted from an incident in the course
of employment, the language of Justice Ephraim Hanson
is relevant. Justice Hanson said:
"Where the Commission is driven to surmise
or conjecture, the injured person or his dependents
cannot recover. This is too well settled to require
citation" (94 Utah 59, 75 P. 2d 312).
In the case of General Mills v. Industrial Commission,
decided December 19, 1941, 101 Utah 214, 120 P. 2d 279,
which was a second decision setting aside an award by the
Commission, the question considered was which of two accidents caused the death of an employee. He had one accident
on March 17, 1938 while in the course of his employment
and another on March 20, 1938, not in the course of his
employment. The Commission on the original hearing
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found that death resulted from the first injury. On first
review by the Supreme Court, award was set aside. On
second hearing before the Commission where additional
evidence was received, it again granted compensation. The
Supreme Court reversed the amended award.
Citing earlier cases, Justice Wolfe, speaking for the
court, said:
"Mere surmise, conjecture, guess or speculation
is insufficient. Further, the burden is on the complainant to prove that the injury is compensable"
(120 P. 2d 280, 101 Utah 217).
The record is sufficient to show that Markus, on May
16, 1964 after getting out from under the wheels of the
car, had some pain and that he went to Kennecott's clinic
and saw a doctor on the following day. The doctor diagnosed it as a sprain (R. 15). Assuming, but not admitting,
that there was an injury received by Markus on May 16,
1964 while working for plaintiff, he suffered no disability
therefrom. In addition to the proof of the injury, he had
the further burden to show by competent evidence that this
accident caused the condition for which he was operated
on by Dr. Holbrook and from which he suffered disability.
No competent evidence is in the record to show this.
The conduct of Markus after May 16, 1964 is inconsistent with his later contentions after he had had his
operation on June 25, 1964 that he had received a herniated
disc as a result of the incident of May 16, 1964. He gave
notice to his employer that he was terminating his employment at the end of his vacation time ^hich he had accumu-
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lated or on about June 7, 1964. He worked at his regular
job with plaintiff every day he was scheduled to work after
the incident to and including May 29, 1964. He did not,
after May 17, 1964, seek any medical attention from his
employer or its doctors. He applied to Travelers Insurance
Company for benefits which might be due him for a nonindustrial disability. It was not until after he had been
operated on by Dr. Holbrook that he applied for workmen's
compensation benefits. He had had back and neck troubles
for years which were apparently corrected by Dr. Holbrook
but which were not the result of the incident of May 16,
1964.
Plaintiff respectively submits that the award of the
Industrial Commission of Utah dated December 14, 1965
in favor of Markus is not justified by the record of the
proceedings and evidence before the Commission, that said
award is arbitrary and that this court should reverse and
annul it.
Respectfully submitted,

PARSONS, BEHLE, EVANS
& LATIMER,
By: ELLIOTT W. EVANS,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
520 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

